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On June 16,2013 Vietnamese police defrocked/tortured Khmer-Krom monk Ven. Ly Chanda of Prey Chop Temple in Lai Hoa, Vinh Chau, Soc Trang province. June 20,2013 Venerable Thach Thuol and Abbot Temple Lieu Ny of Ta Set temple (Soc Trang-Khleang province) defrocked and imprisoned in Prey Nokor (Saigon) city by the Viet authorities. In Phnor Dach (Cau Ngang) district, Preah Trapang/Tra Vinh) Khmer Krom prohibited from watching Cambodian TV signals.

Britain goes to trial for colonial crimes (What about Vietnam's atrocious acts against Khmer Krom ?)

Kenyans look for financial compensation and a state apology for torture committed 60 years ago

As of this month, the British Empire is on trial. Or so goes the story in London.

On Oct. 5, a British high court ruled that three elderly Kenyans who were tortured and abused by colonial authorities in Kenya in the 1950s can proceed with their case against the British government. They are asking for financial compensation and a state apology. Pushing aside the claims of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that too much time has elapsed for a fair trial, and that modern-day Britain is not to blame for the wrongs of its colonial forebears, the high court has, for the first time, allowed colonial victims to sue the British state.

When the decision came down, the trial’s three claimants gathered at the Kenya Human Rights Commission in Nairobi with their supporters. Members of the crowd, some in their 80s, rose to dance in slow shuffles and sing nostalgic ballads from the days of their independence struggles. “This is an historic judgment that will reverberate around the world,” said Martyn Day, the lawyer for the three claimants, greeting reporters in London in what felt like a muted call to arms. “There will undoubtedly be victims of colonial torture from Malaya to the Yemen, from Cyprus to Palestine, who will be reading this judgment with great care.”

“History is on trial,” affirms Harvard University historian Caroline Elkins, who is serving as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. Indeed, the alleged crimes are a half-century old—part of the last gasps of a dying British Empire. But the British government, for its part, does “not dispute that each of the claimants suffered torture and other ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration.” What it does deny is legal liability. The FCO has already announced its intent to appeal the high court’s decision to subject imperial Britain to the scrutiny of modern-day justice.

What is at stake is Britain’s legal liability for events that occurred during colonial rule. How the FCO handles the Kenyans’ damning charges will affect its reputation on the international stage. The pitched legal battle has already uncovered a dramatic tale of “missing” documents, clandestine intelligence operations and allegations of a state cover-up. The world is watching.



The lawsuit brought by the three Kenyans—Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Jane Muthoni Mara and Paulo Muoka Nzili—concerns the brutal effort by colonial authorities in the 1950s to quash an anti-British rebel movement. In the 1940s, more than a half-century into British rule, a small group of mostly Kikuyu, the country’s majority ethnic group, formed the Mau Mau: a secret group whose followers took an oath to oppose British rule. The practice of “oathing” spread across Kenya’s bucolic farmlands, with thousands of Kenyans swearing (sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress) to give their life for the independence cause. The Mau Mau came to resemble a kind of amorphous insurgency, with up to 25,000 operating as forest fighters, where they’d fled to hide. And though the vast majority opposed the initial move to violence, a core of radicalized members—bound by the ritual of drinking animal blood—took an oath to kill. Those rebels murdered around 30 Europeans, as well as hundreds of colonial officers and loyalists.

In response, colonial authorities began an aggressive and large-scale counter-insurgency aimed at strangling the Mau Mau. In October 1952, Kenyan Governor Evelyn Baring, the Queen’s representative in Kenya, declared a state of emergency. Two years later, the colonial army began rounding up Kikuyu by the thousands, erecting barbed-wire compounds to house the alleged oath-takers. The so-called “Kenya Emergency” lasted until 1960. An estimated 150,000 Kenyans were detained; a “pipeline” of detention camps was set up to house them. Tens of thousands died in the camps, with many more left scarred by torture.

The three plaintiffs are survivors of the camps. Their 2010 witness statements detail the most depraved acts of their army aggressors. In one statement, Jane Muthoni Mara recounts how, as a teenager, she was arrested for helping to feed a group of Mau Mau rebels that included her brother. At the screening camp in Gatithi, Mara claims, British officers pried her legs apart and shoved a bottle filled with scalding water into her vagina. In a second statement, Wambugu Wa Nyingi details years of steady and severe whippings. In his statement, Paulo Muoka Nzili describes being castrated with a pair of pliers.

In 1960, the Kenyan Emergency ended. The detention camps were closed. Three years later, Kenya was granted independence. Back in London, army officials like Gen. George Erskine—who as early as 1953 acknowledged in a letter to the British Secretary of State for War that the revelation of their conduct “would be shattering”—kept mum. The new government did not lift Britain’s ban on the Mau Mau, and surviving members were driven further underground—until 2003, when the organization was more or less obsolete, with many members deceased.

But in 2005, the floodgates opened, when two revisionist accounts of the Kenyan Emergency were published to popular acclaim, one by Caroline Elkins, a Harvard historian, and one by the Oxford University historian David Anderson. Elkins’s Imperial Reckoning won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction. Soon after, Mau Mau veterans associations began registering members. The Kenya Human Rights Commission in Nairobi sent young lawyers out to hunt for plaintiffs; a few survivors were selected to take the case forward. Three historians, including Anderson and Elkins, were brought on board to act as expert witnesses, to fill the role that a ballistics specialist might play in a military trial, or a psychiatrist in a murder case.

The fight over whether this case should go to trial has carried on for years. Initially, the FCO resisted on technical grounds: yes, torture took place, but the Kenyan Republic assumed responsibility for it upon independence. When that plea was rejected by a judge in 2011, the FCO changed its tack, contending that a fair trial was no longer possible since “the key decision makers are dead and unable to give their account of what happened.” This month’s decision overruled that claim too. “The difficulties advanced by the defendant,” the judge wrote, “are more illusory than real.”

In a statement released after the court’s ruling, the FCO accepted that the judgment had “potentially significant and far-reaching legal implications.” A spokesperson refused to elaborate on what those “far-reaching implications” might be.



Meanwhile, historians have been looking back in time. Or trying to. About a decade ago, historian David Anderson realized that something was awry at the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi. “There were missing blocks of files,” Anderson explained from his office in an old house inhabited by Oxford’s African Studies Centre. Behind his desk, a shelf is lined with faded binders labelled Mau Mau. “In critical deposits, there were batches of five, 10 files missing. For no apparent reason,” he says. “Wouldn’t your alarm bells ring?” From file catalogues, Anderson could see that most of the missing material concerned accusations of abuse from the Kenyan Emergency period.

Meanwhile, historians in Britain found references to documents that had been whisked to London after independence—in violation of Britain’s pledge to hand over all files to Kenya. Inquiries were made, but the FCO denied having any such documentation. When the Mau Mau trial got under way, the FCO was pressed again. Again, the office professed ignorance.

The back-and-forth that ensued has been recounted in excruciating detail in pages of official inquiry reports that have been hungrily reprinted in the British press. Last year, the prosecution uncovered the treasure trove at a high-security government building at Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire. The so-called “migrated archives” contained 8,800 FCO files—1½ tonnes of missing documents.

The files represent a bombshell for the British government, because they contain material from 37 former colonies, including more than 15,000 pages deemed directly relevant to the Mau Mau trial. The papers prove that there were operations “to remove documents in every single British colony,” says Anderson—“things they didn’t want successor governments to see.” In Uganda, the purge was code-named Operation Legacy. The new documents show that some of the most top-secret files are still missing. And they confirm what historians have long suspected: that many more document caches were illegally set ablaze as the empire crumbled.

Tony Badger, an independent University of Cambridge historian hired by the FCO to oversee the file transfer, calls the episode “embarrassing.” But he accepts the government’s explanation that incompetence, not malfeasance, is to blame for the FCO’s “missed opportunity to come clean.” This intrigue does not bode well for an empire on the defence. “Whether [the remaining documents] are really lost or whether they were conveniently misplaced is an open question,” says Anderson. His verdict? “I very much doubt that they were destroyed,” he whispers. “To be candid, my guess is that they’re with MI somewhere. They’re with the spooks.”



For the past few weeks, rumours have been circulating in London that victims of other colonial atrocities might follow Kenya’s lead. Survivors of the 1950s Cyprus Emergency are seen as viable candidates. They include former members of the EOKA, a Greek Cypriot independence organization that fought British rule and was countered with brute force.

One recent morning at his central London office, Day, the Mau Mau lawyer, looked uncomfortable when asked whether he had been contacted by Cypriot lawyers. “Odd bits,” he mumbled. “It’s kind of vague at this stage.” When pressed about the nature of those contacts, he refused to elaborate. “Ah, I’m not saying too much.”

George Morara, of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, who oversees the case, was more forthcoming. He says the commission has been contacted by people in Malaysia, India, Zimbabwe and Uganda. Morara says he will advise them on how to initiate claims against Britain—how to seek recompense for colonial violence that was, until now, simply seen as a constituent of imperial rule. “If you want to come talk with us,” he enthuses in his warm baritone, “you are most welcome.”

The Mau Mau case is unique because it marks the first time that British colonialism has been put to trial. But it fits with a broader push for historical trials over the past few decades: of aging former Nazis or Francoists or out-of-office Chilean dictators. These trials rarely proceed smoothly. Costly and divisive, they shove lawyers and the judiciary into the role of amateur historian, forced to reconstruct and interpret long-ago history in order to judge the specific crimes at issue.

Day explains that in this trial, it is “quite crucial” for him to prove that British violence in colonial Kenya was “systemic.” The defendant, after all, is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—not an army officer or a civil servant. To do so, Day must link individual acts of unlawful detention or castration “to the halls of British government,” as he says.

Elkins says that such a system revealed itself in 1957, soon after the colonial office in Kenya approved the “dilution technique,” which allowed officers to use “compelling force” against suspected oath-takers. The Cowan Plan, named for prisons commissioner J.B.T. Cowan, authorized the use of violence and forced labour, was a derivative of that technique. It was rubber-stamped by the government in London after meetings at the Foreign Office in which British officials were briefed on the situation in Kenya. “The evidence is just overwhelming,” insists Elkins. “We’re swimming in it.”

But this legal approach can mean that individual acts or agents are glossed over—in an effort to expose the “system” behind them. When asked whether his clients had considered bringing a case against surviving colonial officers, Day just shrugged. “Vaguely.”

In London, a popular history of British colonialism is being written through press coverage of this trial. But in many newspaper articles, that history is askew. Often missing, for instance, is any acknowledgement that Mau Mau rebels also committed horrific murders. On the crude balance sheet of history, their crimes are considered less weighty. To Day, his clients have become “stand-ins” for colonial victimhood; in this way, the FCO may be standing in for the Imperial Army.

Huw Bennett, another historian involved in the trial, is rooting for a shift in popular perceptions of that army. “There [is] this impression,” Bennett explains, “that the British army doesn’t do war crimes.” It is popular in British academic circles to contrast British restraint with America’s bloody excesses. People believe this is what “Americans do in Vietnam or in Abu Ghraib,” Bennett scoffs. “It’s the kind of thing the French do in Algeria. But atrocities—that’s not British stuff!”

On Oct. 26, a hearing will determine how the trial will move forward; Day expects more cases to be filed. And yet the mood was jubilant in Nairobi on the day the decision was handed down. “I am very, very happy,” said Wambugu Wa Nyingi, who still bears black marks on his ankles where manacles rubbed his skin raw over 50 years ago. “My heart is clean,” echoed Jane Muthoni Mara, who is still haunted by visions of her sexual assault. “I will tell [my children] I won.”

Source: by Katie Engelhart on Friday, October 19, 2012 Macleans.ca
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Vietnamization of Cambodia (Nam Tiến) is Well Alive

By Michael Benge,
October 28,2012

Like a toxic fungus spreading its roots throughout Cambodia, communist Vietnam is slowly and methodically colonizing and swallowing up its neighbor. Researchers estimate that over 40% of Cambodia's voting population is comprised of Vietnamese migrants who have been awarded citizenship and voting rights by Vietnam's puppet -- Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. As part of its colonization process, Vietnam has established chapters of the United Front for National Construction and Defense of Cambodia -- a cover for Vietnam's Fatherland Front -- in all 23 provinces of the country. Thugs from this parastatal "Front," often supplemented by plainclothes police, are used to beat, disperse, and sometimes kill demonstrators protesting religious and human rights abuses, land grabbing, and other abuses by the government, which provides Vietnamese officials with plausible deniability of its repressive acts. The Hun Sen regime has also permitted Vietnam to place "advisors" throughout the Cambodian government and military, including those that oversee religious, cultural, and educational affairs.

After its failed and thinly-disguised attempt to colonize Cambodia during its December 25, 1978 invasion and the subsequent 10-year occupation, Vietnam was forced to withdraw its army with its dogmatic tail between its legs with 52,000 dead and over 200,000 wounded. Vietnam's army was in near-revolt, for Hanoi had promised that once it took over South Vietnam following the US withdrawal, there would be peace and soldiers would be given land to farm. In keeping with Vietnam's historical strategy of gaining territory, referred to as đồn điền (military colonization) and as a sop to the Army, Hanoi demobilized about 200,000 of its troops in Eastern Cambodia. These were given land titles and citizenship by the Vietnam's newly-anointed puppet, the former Khmer Rouge Prime Minister Hun Sen. The demobilized army units were kept as "ready reserve forces," and in keeping with another historical term tây tiến (westward movement), they soon brought their families, relatives, and friends, followed by waves of illegal immigrants. Hun Sen has also conceded several kilometers of land along the length of Cambodia's border with Vietnam; from the Laotian border south to Kampot, which had been part of the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War.

At the recent Cambodian National Conference in Arlington, Virginia, Mu Sochua, a member of the Cambodian parliament and the general secretary of the newly formed opposition party -- the Democratic Movement for National Rescue, spoke passionately about a number of topics including the recent murder of an environmental activist and a journalist; fears of rigged upcoming elections; the suppression of free speech; the imprisonment of an opposition radio owner; and land-grabbing protesters. She also spoke on a plethora of other human rights violations not only by the government but also by the army, including the "blood wood" forestry scandal and the rape of Cambodia's other natural resources.

Rong Chhun, president of the Cambodian Confederation of Unions, gave a powerful presentation speaking about the horrendous working conditions and near slave-labor wages of garment workers in Cambodia, the products of which are imported mainly by the U.S., with no regard to the suffering of the workers. Mr. Chhun and other human rights advocates continually face judicial harassment and persecution by the government.

Chhun also spoke of his fears for this generation of students who are being ill prepared to move Cambodia forward because of the corrupt educational system with poorly paid teachers who lack proper training and/or are inept. Students have to pay teachers to attend class with what little money they might have to buy lunch goes to the teacher, and often grades not given based on skill or achievement, but rather on the amount of money a student can pay the teacher. Thus children from poor families are unable to get an education.

With a repressive and corrupt leadership and its government and army rife with Khmer Rouge commanders, Cambodia is a country for sale to the highest bidder, to Vietnam, China, or anyone else if the price is right. This includes the land of its farmers, its oil and mineral resources, and its timber. The proceeds are pocketed by Cambodia's nouveau riche billionaire kleptocrats, with little going to improve the lives of its citizenry.

Dams constructed by the Vietnamese through Cambodian shell companies are displacing thousands of farmers and fishermen and flooding tens of thousands of hectares of Cambodia's prime farmland, not to benefit Cambodia's economy or its people, but to provide power for Vietnam's growing economy.

Cambodia's corrupt and repressive army is for hire as enforcers to protect both private Cambodian and foreign interests while receiving military assistance from the American government. The military is used to evict Cambodia farmers from their lands without compensation, in order to create foreign-owned concession plantations of rubber, sugar cane, and other cash crops.

Elections in Cambodia are a charade, marred by intimidation based on Chairman Mao's philosophy that "political power comes from the barrel of a gun." Token opposition is allowed; however, a large percentage of the parliament belongs to the communist party or has been cowed and bought off by Hun Sen and his cronies.

Freedom of speech is limited, and those who dare speak out against the corrupt regime are often stripped of their parliamentary immunity, sued by Hun Sen in the rigged and inept legal system, exiled, or jailed. Such is the case of Beehive Radio owner Mam Sonando who was recently sentenced to 20 years in jail on trumped-up charges of conspiring to establish a separatist zone in Kratie province. Jail sentences were also handed out to 13 others supposedly involved in the alleged plot. Human-rights workers say the case stems from a protest over land-grabbing in Kratie last May that turned violent (shades of Vietnam's "Fatherland Front"). However, the real reason for the prosecution was that Prime Minister Hun Sen was angered by Mam Sonando's talks with a U.S.-based group that is highly critical of the government.
Last April, Cambodia's pre-eminent forestry and environment activist, Chut Wutty, who was investigating the "blood wood" scandal -- trees cut from the ecosystems in the southwestern Cardamom Mountains that are filled with unique and endangered species of plants and animals. Wutty was shot dead by one of three military policemen protecting an illegal logging concession. In September, Cambodian journalist Hang Serei Odom, who was investigating illegal logging, was hacked to death and stuffed in the trunk by a military officer and his wife. U.S.-donated camouflaged trucks full of first and second-grade timber operated by men wearing military uniforms are not an uncommon sight.

A recent Wall Street Journal editorial pointed out that "the Obama administration has remained largely silent" on the persecution and state-sponsored murders of land defenders. Secretary of State Clinton kept mum on these matters during her recent visit with officials in Cambodia. In May 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Carol Rodley admitted that approximately U.S. $500 million a year of foreign aid is lost through corruption. The Obama Administration has yet to utter a word about the far greater corruption and the human rights abuses in Cambodia by Hen Sen and his regime.

And the Band Plays On!

Michael Benge spent 11 years in Vietnam as a foreign service officer and is a student of South East Asian politics. He is very active in advocating for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy for the peoples of the region and has written extensively on these subjects.

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Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform

by Khanh Vu Duc FRIDAY, 26 OCTOBER 2012

If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures

Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.

More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.

In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.

A Revolt of the Ruling Elite


The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.

Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.

But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (often times through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.

Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.

The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”

Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.

The Party is the System


The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.

And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.

Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.

Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.

A Need for Structural Reform


The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.

Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.

Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.

Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.

When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.

While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.

Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.

This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)
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UNPO General Secretary Calls for Urgent Action Regarding the Hmong

UNPO General Secretary Marino Busdachin says the Lao and Vietnamese military campaign to cleanse Laos of its ethnic Hmong inhabitants can no longer be ignored.

UNPO General Secretary Marino Busdachin and the Congress of World Hmong People call on the European Parliament to speak out against the continued violent cleansing campaign perpetrated by the Lao and Vietnamese militaries that targets the ethnic Hmong inhabitants of north-central Laos.

On 19 October 2012, President Chong Lor Her of the United Hmong ChaoFa Democracy pleaded for immediate humanitarian assistance to the Phou Bia region of Laos. Children and the elderly are starving as the Lao and Vietnamese military forces continue to cut off and destroy the food sources of the Hmong people in Phou Bia, Zaysombun Special Zone.

Six military battalions – three Vietnamese and three Lao – are now closing in on the Phou Bia region with the intent to cleanse the region of its ethnic Hmong inhabitants. Foot soldiers are entering Phou Bia from all directions and helicopters are continually flying in and out, transporting soldiers and supplies to the region. Two nearby military camps – one to the north-east of Phou Bia and one to the north-west – are stocked with 60mm and 81mm heavy weapons. Three permanent military camps have also been set up further to the north.

UNPO General Secretary Marino Busdachin calls on the European Parliament to speak out against the campaign of the Lao and Vietnamese militaries to cleanse the region of its ethnic Hmong population.

We thank you for your action in this urgent matter.

For media queries please contact:

Maud Vanwalleghem | +32 251 314 59 | m.vanwalleghem@unpo.org


Source: UNPO October 24,2012

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Vietnam's Nguyen Tan Dung admits 'faults' on economy

Vietnam's prime minister has admitted he made mistakes managing the country's faltering economy, promising to reform state firms hit by corruption scandals.

Nguyen Tan Dung said in a parliamentary speech that he recognised his "political responsibility".

He was spared disciplinary action over financial scandals last week after a meeting of Communist Party leaders.

Public anger over corruption at state-owned firms had put the PM under pressure before the meeting.

"I recognise my political responsibility and my faults," the prime minister said at the opening of Vietnam's national assembly.

"We have learned our lesson."

Nguyen Tan Dung's government has faced a series of corruption scandals at state-owned enterprises like Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) and Vietnam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines).

In March, nine top officials were jailed for their roles in the near-bankruptcy of Vinashin.

Last month, the former chairman of Vinalines was arrested abroad and extradited for ''alleged economic crimes''.

Nguyen Tan Dung has been prime minister since 2006 and came into office amid expectations that he would continue economic and political reforms in the country.

However, a global financial crisis two years later saw Vietnam's economy slump after decades of high growth and it has since been faced with problems such as high inflation and debt.

The prime minister has also been under pressure from some bloggers discussing corruption cases and human rights issues online.

Source: BBC News Oct 22,2012
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Cambodia's Monarchy under Hun Sen Regime?

Ex-king Norodom Sihanouk's death raises questions about the future of the country's royal institution.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen may have acquired from ex-king Norodom Sihanouk some shrewd political skills that have made him Southeast Asia’s longest serving leader today. But now that the charismatic ruler is dead, will the powerful Hun Sen deftly move to dismantle the monarchy to further shore up his position?

This question is obviously in the minds of Cambodians as they mourn the death of Sihanouk, who succumbed to a heart attack this week in his "second home" Beijing while undergoing treatment for cancer.

When he was on the throne, Sihanouk had often clashed with Hun Sen. Their relationship was a rocky one, especially after 1997 when the tough Hun Sen began dominating power in Cambodia and undercut Sihanouk's influence.

Though Sihanouk cited old age and health problems when he abdicated the throne—for the second and final time—in 2004 in favor of his son Norodom Sihamoni, many believe one of the reasons for his stepping down was his fear that Hun Sen would dismantle the monarchy if they continued to quarrel.

With Sihanouk out of the throne, the monarchy in Cambodia wielded no real power over the last eight years. But it remains a significant institution due to the reverence Cambodians give to the royal family, experts say.

The 59-year-old King Sihamoni, a one-time ballet dancer and cultural ambassador, is seen as completely apolitical and has given little problems to Hun Sen or his senior officials, raising expectations that the 60-year-old prime minister, who has said he will remain in power for another decade, will keep the monarch.

“There is no reason to expect that Hun Sen will act against the monarchy in its present form, despite his occasional highly critical comments on some members of the Cambodian royal family,” said Milton Osborne, a Southeast Asian expert at the Lowy Institute, an international policy think tank in Sydney, Australia.

“King Sihamoni has followed a strictly correct role as king without any hint of involvement in political issues. He is relatively young and in good health, and could remain on the throne for many years to come,” Osborne said in a blog post.

No threat

King Sihamoni is unmarried and has no children but this does not threaten the succession because Cambodia's constitution provides for an elective monarchy drawn from descendants of the 19th century monarch, King Ang Duang, said Osborne, who has written an unauthorized biography Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness.

Even though hundreds of thousands of Cambodians lined the streets to pay respects to Sihanouk when his body was flown in Wednesday from Beijing, Osborne points out that the bulk of the population has no personal memory of the “golden” years of the mercurial ex-king and independence hero who helped steer Cambodia through five decades of war, genocide, and disorder.

This could change their perception of the monarchy, he said.

“I think there is a genuine adherence to the monarchy, particularly in the peasantry who see the king still as a very special figure, almost divine to some extent. But in fact the majority of Cambodians have grown up without a powerful monarch in the palace in Phnom Penh and I think that does change the way people look at the institution.”

Still, Hun Sen did not take any chances.

Knowing well that Sihanouk was revered at home, the prime minister wasted little time before displaying his affection to the late “King-Father” upon his death.

On learning that the monarch had died in the Chinese capital, Hun Sen immediately flew to Beijing with King Sihamoni to escort his body home.

Then, on returning to Phnom Penh with Sihanouk's body, Hun Sen accompanied the casket as it weaved through the streets of Phnom Penh on a golden float.

Hun Sen also made sure that Sihanouk received a lavish state funeral.

He declared a week of mourning and ordered that the charismatic leader’s body lie in state at the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh for three months during which time the public can pay respects before it is cremated according to Buddhist ritual.

Even stronger

Some believe Hun Sen, who has been at the helm of Cambodian politics for more than three decades and whose administration is often accused of suppressing political freedoms and mistreatment of rights campaigners, will emerge even stronger after Sihanouk’s death.

“This is a new era for Hun Sen,” Lao Moung Hay, a former civil servant and professor of law and economics, told the New York Times. “There is no force to restrain him anymore—there are risks for the country.”

Prince Sisowath Thomico, King Sihanouk’s longtime private secretary and nephew, told the paper that some Cambodians were worried and afraid after Sihanouk’s death.

“He had such charisma,” the prince said. “And now there will be a kind of hiatus. The people of Cambodia will have to wait for the next person who will have that same moral authority.”

While Sihanouk may have been a consummate politician and had survived political maneuvering during the bloody Vietnam War and Pol Pot's murderous Khmer Rouge regime, he is being blamed by some quarters for the extensive powers that have been accumulated by Hun Sen today.

“Not noted in many [of Sihanouk’s] obituaries, however, is one important point,” said Joshua Kurlantzick, a Southeast Asian expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“At several times during his reign, Sihanouk made noises about opening Cambodia up to true multiparty democracy, but he never could really do so, preferring instead to keep all parties under the thumb of himself and the royalist establishment,” Kurlantzick said.

He acknowledged that at times, Sihanouk’s beneficent monarchical style proved effective—in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, “he made many judicious and foresighted decisions for his country.”

“But though he is hardly the only one to blame for Cambodia’s current political state, his inability to ever move beyond his patrician, monarchical, and authoritarian style left a legacy of big man rule that Hun Sen, for years Sihanouk’s antagonist, has readily adopted."

“Today, in fact, the true heir of Sihanouk is not his son Sihamoni, who sits on a far less valuable throne, but rather Hun Sen, who controls Cambodia the way Sihanouk once did.”
Source: An analysis by Parameswaran Ponnudurai 2012-10-17 Radio Free Asia
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Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung Keeps Position as Economic Struggles Continue

HANOI, VIETNAM — Vietnam's prime minister appears to have survived a leadership challenge this week over his handling of the poorly-performing economy.

Communist Party officials ended any speculation that Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung might lose his job when they concluded a top-level party meeting on Monday.

The 175-member party central committee met for two weeks to discuss a long list of topics, ranging from economic reform and land use to education.

The run-up to what is usually a low-key event attracted international attention following several arrests over a banking scandal and the publication in political blogs of material highly critical of the 62-year-old prime minister, whom many blame for the country’s economic crisis.

Mistakes acknowledged

In a nationally broadcast speech at the conclusion of the meeting, party secretary Nguyen Phu Trong apologized for the mismanagement of the struggling economy.

Trong said the party had made some big mistakes, especially in not preventing corruption and deterioration among some of its members. He added, however, the one member who deserved punishment would be spared.

Many believe that person is the prime minister.

Vietnam analyst Tuong Vu, a professor at the University of Oregon, said Dung’s rivals clearly failed to oust him from power, but Trong’s speech should be interpreted as a warning to the prime minister’s supporters.

“They tried first in the politburo, they failed. They brought it to the central commission, they failed. And now they have to put a spin on it and so they will try to admit defeat and try to mobilize support for their faction, and send a warning message to the prime minister's faction,” said Vu.

Faltering ascent

Dung established his political support base by achieving high economic growth rates. Under his command, Vietnam was focused on becoming the world’s leading shipbuilder. That goal was derailed by the global financial crisis, followed by massive corruption scandals.

In the run-up to the meeting, some analysts predicted Dung would be ousted by his rivals, President Truong Tan Sang and Party Secretary Trong.

Regional security analyst, Professor Carl Thayer, said a dramatic change was not very likely, though, given the makeup of the country's powerful central committee.

“About 40 per cent on the central committee are on there because of him. That’s just a ball park figure. Those people would resist having him removed because it would unravel. The problem with a system like this is nothing is independent. Everything is dependent on the party,” he said.

Economic reforms

Thayer said the prime minister may have retained his position, but his power has been undermined.

Prime Minister Dung was given an agenda to reform state-owned enterprises and sort out the banking system. Further investigations into shipbuilding giants Vinashin and Vinalines also were singled out.

Economists say the results of the meeting are good news for investors, who could have more confidence that economic reforms finally will be carried through.

Dung is now in his second term and will be of retiring age by the time the next party congress convenes. This also will affect his political power, said Thayer, as people are less likely to ally themselves with him.

“If you’re hanging on to Nguyen Tan Dung, he’s going to be lame duck. He’s going to be 65 by the next congress. He had his two terms in office, like an American president he has a second term. In the end power begins to wane,” said Thayer.

Others disagree, saying Dung could well remain in power, but with a different title, perhaps in the position of party secretary.

Analysts say the high-tension rivalry between the country’s top leaders is symptomatic of the shifting relationship between state and party. Associate professor Vu said the state has become so rich and powerful in recent years that party leaders like Trong are losing control.

“There has been a natural process of economic reform that brings more power to the state and causing the ideology that the party represents, system which the party controls, is losing relevance,” said Vu.

It may be years in the future, but observers say change is inevitable for Vietnam as economic reform eclipses communist ideology and the legitimacy of the party.

Source: Marianne Brown VOANews Oct 17,2012
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US to invite Myanmar to joint military exercises

The United States will invite Myanmar to the world's largest multinational military field exercise, a powerful symbolic gesture toward a military with a grim human rights record and a milestone in its rapprochement with the West.


The United States will invite Myanmar to the world's largest multinational military field exercise, a powerful symbolic gesture toward a military with a grim human rights record and a milestone in its rapprochement with the West.

Myanmar has been invited to observe Cobra Gold, which brings together more than 10,000 American and Thai military personnel and participants from other Asian countries for joint annual manoeuvres, officials from countries participating in the exercises told Reuters.

"It's significant. In the past, Myanmar has always been unhappy about this Cobra Gold, thinking that it was directed against them and was like a step towards invasion," said Dr Tin Maung Maung Than, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and expert on Myanmar's military.

The invitation is part of a carefully calibrated re-engagement with Myanmar's military under the umbrella of humanitarian dialogue, the sources said, constituting one of the boldest rewards for Myanmar's new semi-civilian government after 49 years of direct military rule.

It is also seen as a first step towards US-Myanmar military-to-military ties, cut off after 1988 when soldiers opened fire on pro-democracy protesters in a crackdown that killed or wounded thousands and led to the house arrest of democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi.

The invitation came after intense lobbying by Thailand, co-host of the exercises, the sources said.

It could prompt charges that Washington is moving too quickly in seeking to rehabilitate a military accused of continued human rights violations in ethnic regions such as Kachin State where tens of thousands of people have been displaced in 16 months of fighting.

Refugees fled forced labour, killings, rape and torture by the Myanmar military, reported Human Rights Watch in June.

The invitation follows a visit this week by a delegation led by Michael Posner, the US State Department's top human rights official, to Naypyitaw, the capital of Myanmar, also known as Burma. The U.S. team also included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Vikram Singh and other US military officials.

The talks on the Myanmar side were led by Deputy Minister for Defence Commodore Aung Thaw. Myanmar state media reported that the "two sides held talks on levels and operations of defence institutions of Myanmar and US and exchanged views on future dialogue and bilateral cooperation."

US officials in Bangkok and Washington declined to comment.

"If there is a decision to move forward with military-to-military operations with Burma, then we are going to be prepared to support that the best we can," the head of US Pacific Command, Navy Admiral Samuel Locklear, told journalists in Bangkok on Tuesday.

HISTORIC US TIES

The invitation is another illustration of the Obama administration's pivot this year from Iraq and Afghanistan to focus national security resources on the Asia-Pacific region.

Cobra Gold take places in Chon Buri, a province east of Bangkok where the United States built up a massive military presence during the Vietnam War. It began in 1980.

Last year, about 10,000 US military personnel took part, along with about 3,400 Thais. Five other countries participated - Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. And nine countries sent observers, including China.

The US military once had strong ties with the Tatmadaw, as Myanmar calls it military, a word that translates as "Royal Force" and recalls an age of Myanmar's warrior kings.

Even when it was a dictatorship, Myanmar sent more officers to the United States than any other country. More than 1,200 officers trained there between Myanmar's independence from Britain in 1948 and General Ne Win's military coup in 1962, according to Maung Aung Myoe, author of "Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948."

Ne Win's coup ushered in nearly half a century of isolation and misrule, but the United States maintained military ties as a bulwark against the spread of communism from neighbouring China.

Some 255 Myanmar officers graduated from the United States from 1980 to 1988 under the International Military Education and Training programme, more than from any other country, said Maung Aung Myoe. The programme was halted, and US sanctions were imposed, after the junta crushed the 1988 uprising and refused to honour the results of a general election won by Suu Kyi's party two years later.

AMERICAN REMAINS

Re-engagement began in earnest with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's historic visit to Naypyitaw in November last year. Clinton said she spoke with President Thein Sein about recovering the remains of U.S. servicemen who died in Myanmar during World War II, noting that "the search for missing Americans once helped us repair relations with Vietnam."

During World War Two, nearly 1,000 Americans and 600 planes were lost over Myanmar due to bad weather and Japanese guns while flying from India to China. About 730 Americans remain unaccounted for, according to the U.S. Defense Department.

The Hawaii-based unit Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) ran three missions in Myanmar before its patron, former spy chief Khin Nyunt, was purged by ex-dictator Than Shwe in 2004. After Clinton's visit, the United States and Myanmar governments began talks about resuming the missions.

In August, a team of military intelligence officers from Myanmar visited JPAC to learn about remains recovery techniques and to discuss operations in Myanmar, said the US Defense Department. JPAC's plans to resume missions in Myanmar remain "very tentative," its media chief Jamie Dobson told Reuters.

British efforts to re-engage with the Myanmar military have also begun. Retired general Sir Mike Jackson, one of the British Army's most prominent figures, met Myanmar's deputy commander-in-chief General Soe Win in Naypyitaw on September 21. They "frankly discussed promotion of ties" between the British and Myanmar militaries, reported the state-run Myanmar News Agency.

source: www.moneycontrol.com Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 10:42
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AMTAC Urges Obama Administration To Reconsider Vietnam's Participation In TPP

The American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC) has sent a letter to U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Ron Kirk urging the Obama Administration to reconsider participation by Vietnam in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) currently being negotiated by the United States, Vietnam and eight other countries — including Canada, which officially joined the partnership last week — located around the Pacific Rim, with Mexico poised to join possibly later this month. The letter calls into question "Vietnam's ability and willingness to serve as a reputable trading partner worthy of the preferences envisioned in any TPP."

The letter cites, among other evidence, the latest annual report titled "List of Goods Produced by Child or Forced Labor," released last month by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs The report added Vietnam to a list of countries that use child and forced labor in apparel production activities.

Several other grounds are also outlined, including Vietnam's status as a single-party state with no competing political parties; its lack of press freedom; the preponderance of state-owned enterprises in its economy; lack of an independent, transparent judicial system; and systematic human rights abuses including suppression of free expression and association, encouragement of activities associated with human trafficking, and other abuses.

The letter continues:

Despite these glaring and unacceptable shortcomings, Vietnam has made enormous market access demands of the United States and other TPP participants. At the same time, they have been virtually unwilling to consider even minimal changes to their economic, judicial, and political systems necessary to make them a reputable preference trading partner. Their intransigence has almost single handedly brought the entire negotiation to a standstill. We believe that the challenges confronting Vietnam in transitioning to a transparent and market driven economy, instituting reasonable foreign investment safeguards, and eliminating abusive labor practices are too great for Vietnam to digest at this point. Their refusal to negotiate in good faith is a direct result of their unwillingness to address the serious economic, political, and moral concerns listed above.

The letter concludes by stating: "We strongly believe that Vietnam should be asked to step back from the negotiation until such time as they make marked improvement in these key areas. To make them beneficiaries of the lucrative market access benefits that will certainly be contained in the TPP would amount to a condoning of their unacceptable behavior in the various areas identified earlier."

Source: TextileWorld.com October 16, 2012
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Cambodia failed to secure two-year seat on the U.N. Security Council

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Rwanda - along with Australia, Argentina, Luxembourg and South Korea - won a seat on the U.N. Security Council on Thursday, despite accusations by a U.N. panel that Rwanda's defense minister commands a rebellion in Democratic Republic of Congo.

Rwanda was unopposed in its bid for the African seat on the council that South Africa will vacate at the end of December, but still needed approval from two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly members present to secure the two-year term. It won 148 votes in the 193-nation assembly.

Argentina also was elected to the council unopposed, winning 182 votes. Australia won a seat with 140 votes, Luxembourg with 131 votes and South Korea with 149.


Cambodia, Bhutan and Finland failed to secure two-year seats on the council.


There are five veto-holding permanent members of the council - the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China - and 10 temporary members without veto power. Thursday's election was for the term from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2014.


Rwanda's government said that it would work with all members of the council to ensure "it is responsive and reflective of the views & aspirations of the developing world."

"Rwanda's troubling and tragic past allows it to bring to the UNSC a unique perspective on matters of war and peace," it posted on a Twitter account created for its Security Council term (@RwandaUNSC).

Before the vote, the Congolese delegation told the General Assembly it objected to Rwanda joining the Security Council, accusing its neighbor of harboring "war criminals operating in the eastern part of the DRC and who are being sought by international justice."

A confidential U.N. report, seen by Reuters on Tuesday, cast a shadow over Rwanda's election to the 15-member U.N. power center - which has the ability to impose sanctions and authorize military interventions.

The Security Council's "Group of Experts" said that Rwanda and Uganda - despite their strong denials - continued to support M23 rebels in their six-month fight against Congolese government troops in the east of the country.

BLATANT VIOLATIONS?

Rwandan President Paul Kagame posted a declaration on Twitter welcoming the result: "No matter what haters say ... justice&truth will prevail!!! Sometimes it just requires a bit of good fight for all that...!!!"

Speaking to reporters in New York, Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo complained about the timing of the leak of the experts report to Reuters two days ahead of the Security Council vote, but added that the leak was "predictable."


She also sought to assure Congo that Rwanda would be a responsible council member. "I believe the Democratic Republic of Congo should see Rwanda on the Security Council as value addition," she said after the vote.

Philippe Bolopion of the advocacy group Human Rights Watch criticized the inclusion of Rwanda on the Security Council.

"After blatantly violating the Security Council's arms embargo and undermining the work of the U.N. by propping up the abusive M23 rebels, Rwanda is rewarded with a seat at the table," he said.

"Kigali is now in a position to try to shield its own officials implicated in abuses from U.N. sanctions, which is a flagrant conflict of interest," Bolopion said in a statement. "Other Security Council members now have an even greater responsibility to hold Rwanda to account."

Britain's Deputy U.N. Ambassador Philip Parham put a more positive spin on Rwanda's election, saying: "We look forward to working with them on issues of international peace and security including the efforts to try to end the cycle of violence in the eastern DRC."

Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr described Australia's election as a "big juicy, decisive win" that endorsed the country as a good global citizen.


"For us as a middle power a long way from the centers of clout in the world, the centers of power in the world, this is a lovely moment," Carr told reporters after the vote.

South Africa, Colombia, Germany, India and Portugal are leaving the Security Council in December. Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Pakistan, Togo and Morocco will remain until the end of 2013.

The last time Rwanda was on the council was in 1994-95. That coincided with a genocide in which 800,000 people were killed when Rwanda's Hutu-led government and ethnic militias went on a 100-day killing spree, massacring Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

The Congolese government on Wednesday demanded targeted sanctions against Rwandan and Ugandan officials named in the U.N. experts report.

According to the U.N. experts, who monitor compliance with sanctions and an arms embargo on the Congo, Rwandan Defense Minister General James Kabarebe was ultimately commanding the rebellion and both Rwanda and Uganda were providing weapons, troops and military and political aid to the insurgency.

Source: By Michelle Nichols and Louis Charbonneau | Reuters
(Additional reporting by Jenny Clover in Kigali and Yara Bayoumy in Nairobi; Editing by Paul Simao and Jackie Frank)

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Does the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Even Matter?

Elizabeth Leader is a Research Associate for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. The author’s views on ASEAN’s human rights progress do not necessarily reflect those of Joshua Kurlantzick.

The Asia-Pacific remains the only UN-defined region that does not adhere to its own human rights treaty or possess a region-wide mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights. Thus, there was seemingly a lot riding on the backs of the ten ASEAN foreign ministers who gathered in New York on Thursday —on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly— to review the second draft of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Concern over the controversial draft (drawn up by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights) has, in the international media, far outweighed any sort of praise. Among the many aspects of the AHRD facing criticism are the possible inclusion of “public morality” as justification for suspending human rights, the opaque fashion in which the document was drafted, the limited participation of civil society organizations in its creation, and its failure to reference many of the marginalized populations who are in dire need of protection (including minorities, the LGBT community, and persons with disabilities). Regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of these aspects, the fact remains that without a corresponding mechanism for enforcement, the AHRD, no matter how forceful its language, will be largely damned to irrelevance.

In his 2006 book Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, former ASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino rationalized ASEAN’s inability to formalize a unified, meaningful stance on human rights: “In the face of such wide divergences in the situations and conceptions of human rights among ASEAN countries, it is hardly feasible for ASEAN to construct a system for intervening in one another’s affair on the grounds of violations of human rights.” While citing the region’s diversity is arguably a ‘cop out’ for ASEAN’s failure to institutionalize respect for human rights, the international community must nonetheless recognize the reality that is ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process, and how this will fundamentally preclude progress on human rights promotion and protection for the foreseeable future. One is hard pressed to find any aspect of human rights for which shared norms or common experiences unite ASEAN’s ten member states. In terms of LGBT rights (a population whose exclusion from the current draft has received international condemnation and media attention), for example, Thailand is seen as one of the most tolerant countries in Asia, while in neighboring Myanmar homosexuality is illegal. No amount of ministerial meetings is likely to bridge such a cultural divide. Indonesia’s foreign minister Marty Natalegawa was candid in his recent admission that “state interests of each nation are also different from one another. Hence, a document that must be reached via consensus will never please all parties.”

Above all, national self-interest will continue to dictate member states’ decision-making. Despite international concern for the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia are unlikely to intervene for fear that other countries may in turn attempt to dictate citizenship standards within their own borders. Thailand, once seen as a beacon of democracy in the region, will not chastise Vietnam’s recent jailing of bloggers for fear that its own, draconian Lèse-Majesté law and the associated Computer Crimes Act will face censure from its neighbors. As long as ASEAN remains an intergovernmental body and not a people-powered institution, the “ASEAN way” will remain one of noninterference, and it is improbable that the protection of human rights will be paid little more than lip service.

Instead, the resources and efforts of Western governments and international NGOs would be better spent focusing on grassroots movements, working bilaterally with the individual governments of member states, and working multilaterally with those networks that are not bound by the rigidities of ASEAN. The Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution (SEANHRI), for example, unites the existing, independent human rights commissions of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (as well as that of ASEAN non-member East Timor). Its website is funded by a European Commission project entitled “Enhancing the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Development of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.” Contrary to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights which lacks the ability to hear cases from individuals, organizations, or groups of people, a recent article in the Bangkok Post described the members of SEANHRI as the “most accessible” human rights mechanisms in the region. There is an opportunity for these commissions to set an example for their neighbors. In 2011, Myanmar established its own human rights commission (although the international community has yet to recognize it as independent, and it has thus far avoided investigation of human rights abuses in conflict-riddled ethnic minority areas). Earlier this month in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was admitted to SEANHRI. Perhaps, in time, Myanmar’s commission will benefit from the exchange of best practices.

The right of marginalized populations in Southeast Asia to be included in the AHRD is undeniable. Their inclusion in the declaration would send a powerful signal to not only ASEAN, but also the greater Asia-Pacific region and the entire international community. But, short of a miracle, a satisfactory AHRD is unlikely to come to fruition in the near future —and prospects for its enforcement are even dimmer. In the meantime, concerned governments and NGOs should continue to explore means of human rights promotion and protection that operate independently of ASEAN.

Source: by Guest Blogger for Joshua Kurlantzick September 28, 2012
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Economic Implications Will Force Better Relations Between Big Powers In Asia Pacific – Analysis

Maritime security has assumed great importance in recent years in view of mankind’s increasing dependence on the seas. Historically, countries sought to boost their power by seeking to control the oceans. During the Cold War years, rivalry between the two power blocs was also extended to the oceans when the US and the Soviet Union tried to establish their supremacy. Though the Super Power rivalry created an uneasy balance of power situation in the oceans, there was at least a semblance of stability in the maintenance of sea lanes, freedom of navigation and so on. The collapse of the Cold War structures removed the earlier uneasy balance, but introduced a great deal of fluidity in the maritime situation. From then on, non-military and non-traditional aspects of maritime security came to be increasingly emphasised.

Two more developments soon followed which had a great bearing on the maritime landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. After gaining freedom, most countries of the region became preoccupied with the tasks of economic reconstruction. In the initial years, they adopted inward-looking economic strategies in their approaches to nation-building. But after the end of the Cold War, there was a major shift in their economic strategies and they began to adopt economic liberalisation programmes based on free market economy. What followed was an unprecedented surge in the economic activities across the seas covering the South and East China Seas and the Indian Ocean. Countries like China, Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN nations and India have started the process of entering into a wide network of free trade and economic partnership agreements and the whole region is already witnessing massive flows of trade, technology and investment. The consistently rising growth trajectories of these countries are predicated on the steady energy supplies from the West Asian region. Any disturbance in these supplies will have serious adverse impact on their economies. It is in this context that they attach utmost importance to the safety of the sea lanes that pass through Southeast Asia such as the Malacca Strait which alone witnesses more than 60 thousand ships plying annually through the narrow choke point. The Strait provides a crucial link between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Japan, China, South Korea and ASEAN countries depend upon West Asia for more than 70-75 per cent of their energy needs. As their demands for energy grow in the coming years, the pressure on the West Asian countries will also increase correspondingly. It is therefore imperative for them to ensure peace and political stability in the West Asian region and maintain the security of the sea lanes.

The second development relates to the extensive changes in the maritime jurisdiction under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which came into force in 1994. Countries, which had earlier conducted their maritime activities without much concern for their neighbours, have now come under many restrictions. The UNCLOS has recognized the right of a country to claim: a) a twelve nautical mile territorial sea measured from baseline; b) an additional twelve nautical mile contiguous zone in which countries can punish violation of their customs, immigration, etc., laws within their territory or territorial zone; c) a continental shelf to a maximum of 350 nautical miles and d) an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from baseline and in which countries have rights over resources and all related activities as well as jurisdiction over artificial structures, marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment. Many of the present problems between countries arise from their interpretation of EEZ boundaries, territorial claims to islands in South and East China Sea regions.

South China Sea

South China Sea region has become a centre of great tension due to territorial disputes between China and several ASEAN countries on Spratly and Paracel islands. During the 1990s, China pursued its territorial claims in the region with great assertiveness and this created a good deal of suspicion and distrust among ASEAN countries. After 2000, however, China seemed to have mellowed a little and this resulted in the signing of the Declaration on the conduct of parties in South China Sea in 2002. By this Declaration, China agreed to desist from using force, respect freedom of navigation of other countries and stay away from taking over unoccupied islands. The improved atmospherics helped China, Vietnam and the Philippines to undertake joint surveys of ocean resources around the Spratly islands. Unfortunately, this trend proved to be rather temporary and soon China reverted to its earlier assertive policies in the region. In recent years, China has intensified its patrolling activities to oversee its EEZ, protect its fishermen and observe the activities of the foreign fishing boats. Further, there has been a marked increase in its naval exercises in the area inviting strong protests from countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. The People’s Liberation Army’s fleets have deployed warships to South China Sea.

Both the US and China have also exchanged strong protests against each other’s naval operations. In every meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has spoken strongly on the need for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea region. She has also urged both China and ASEAN to work towards framing a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The US, Japan and other allies have pressed China to make its territorial claims in the South China Sea on the basis of international law and not on the basis of historical events or threats. Clinton called upon both China and ASEAN countries to work out a code of conduct consistent with international law. The building of a new naval base on the Hainan Island from where China can deploy most advanced missile submarines and the launching of its aircraft carrier have further heightened the concerns of ASEAN countries who would like to see American naval presence in the region as a shield against the Chinese ’threat’. But China considers American presence as an unwarranted interference and strongly prefers to deal with the concerned ASEAN countries bilaterally. In this connection, it is useful to note the proactive attitude of Japan on this question. Although Japan does not have a territorial issue in this region, the sea lanes of the region that carry 90 per cent of Japan’s crude oil, are a key factor for its economy. Japan has offered to cooperate with the coast guards of the ASEAN countries. It deserves to be noted that Japan has agreed to provide several patrol boats to the Philippines and improve its maritime surveillance capacity. In addition, Japan has also agreed to promote defence relations with Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Japan is also keen to see that ASEAN countries remain cohesive and approach their regional maritime issues collectively as a unit instead of dealing with China individually. Further, Japan fears that if China succeeds in establishing its sovereignty over some islands through bullying, it may adopt the same tactics in its claim over the disputed Senkaku islands in the East China Sea region. There is a strong convergence of strategic interests of the US, Japan and ASEAN and how they will leverage it to bring China to the negotiating table for a long-term understanding remains to be seen. Tokyo is also keen to convene a special Japan-ASEAN meeting focused on maritime security in 2013.

East China Sea

In the previous article, we have seen a report on how the territorial question on the Takeshima Islands has strained relations between Japan and South Korea. With both countries sticking stubbornly to their respective positions, there is very little prospect of any movement towards a solution to the issue. Even before the political outcry subsided in South Korea, Japan is now faced with a more complex territorial issue with China and to a lesser extent with Taiwan. It relates to the Senkaku Islands which are under the administrative control of Japan, but China and Taiwan contest the Japanese sovereignty over the islands. The Senkaku chain consists of five islands -Uotsurijima. Kita-Kojima, Minam-Kojima, Kubashima and Taishoto located at the eastern edge of the East China Sea with a total area of 7 sq km. Clustered around the biggest island, Uotsuri, the islands chain lies 170 km northeast of Taiwan and 410 km west of Okinawa. There is no human habitation in these islands.

Neither China nor Taiwan seriously contested Japanese ownership of the islands until the 1970s when the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East came out with findings of undersea oil, gas and other natural resources around the Senkaku Islands. According to Japan, after 1885 onwards, the Government of Japan had made regular surveys of the Islands through official agencies of the Okinawa prefecture. These surveys testified that there was no human habitation in these islands and that there was no indication of Chinese control over them at any point. Whereas China traces its ownership of the islands to the fifteenth century, Japan’s position is that the Senkakus did not belong to any country when it formally incorporated the islands in January 1895. A private entrepreneur set up a fisheries processing plant on Uotsurjima at the turn of 1900, and when the business failed, the islands were virtually deserted until they were sold to Kunioki Kurihara of Saitama prefecture in the 1970s. Following the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the Senkakus came under the control of the US administration as part of the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands until 1972 when the Islands were reverted to Japan as part of the Okinawa Prefecture.

Though China had always claimed the Senkakus, it did not rake up a controversy as its leader Deng Xiaoping cautioned that China’s economic development could take place unhindered only in a peaceful neighbourhood. He also believed that a settlement to the dispute could be best left to the next generation which would be wiser than the present one. But the fact that both China and Japan had not fixed the borders of their new EEZs in the East China Sea, created tension and led to mutual accusations of violating each other’s maritime jurisdiction. Japan had deep suspicion that China was illegally exploiting the ocean resources belonging to its EEZs. In 2008 they reached a temporary agreement which would have enabled them to work out joint cooperation in exploiting the natural resources until a permanent agreement was signed. But it was not put to successful operation due to lack of domestic consensus in both countries. Since then China has increased its maritime activities in the East China Sea contributing to serious deterioration in the bilateral relations. The September 2010 incident in which a Chinese ship collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel near the Senkaku islands caused a major diplomatic row between the two countries. The arrest of a Chinese naval captain by Japan added further fuel to the fire. Ultimately, the crisis situation was defused by the release of the Chinese captain, but it left a deep trail of bitterness in both countries.

More recently, in the middle of September 2012, relations once again became more seriously strained following the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese Government. China’s reaction to this was seen in different forms. First, violent demonstrations all across the country broke out attacking Japanese people and properties. Japanese companies, plants and department stores were closed. China cancelled several important events commemorating the fortieth year of their diplomatic relations. Second, several Chinese nationalists from Hong Kong and the mainland forcibly landed on the Senkaku islands and were removed by the Japanese navy. China sent scores of its surveillance ships to the waters close to the Senkakus generating heat and tension in the region. Relations between the two had never sunk so low and some voices were heard in China on the need to ’regain’ the islands even by force. In the midst of these developments the US has made it known that without going into the merits of the dispute, it has a treaty obligation to stand by Japan since the Senkaku Islands are under the Japanese effective control. China does not agree with this stand. The official People’s Daily editorially stated “The US-Japan Security Treaty is a by-product of the Cold War era and should not damage the interests of third parties including China. Any nation that seeks to interfere in the Daioyu islands issue will experience a loss of their interest.”

Though the bilateral relations have deteriorated to an extent not witnessed since normalisation, there is a realization that both countries have to pay heavily for this. Their trade volume amounting to about $350 billion will seriously suffer if the current downward trend is not checked in time. So is the case with Japanese investment in China. Already there are reports that Japanese investors are looking for alternative options for their investments. Realising the implications, China allowed a delegation of business, cultural and political groups led by former speaker of the Japanese House of Representatives Yohei Kono to visit China and they were met by a senior member of China’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Though the talks between the two sides were marked by considerable tension, there was an underlying hope that relations would improve in the coming days.

October 15, 2012 by K.V. Kesavan is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
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HAPPY PCHUM BEN-SENE DUONTA 2012!!!






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Cambodia former king Norodom Sihanouk dies aged 89

Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian king who was a key figure through decades of upheaval, has died.

The former king died at a hospital in the Chinese capital, Beijing, after having a heart attack. He had been in poor health for several years.

Sihanouk, who was 89, came to the throne in 1941 and led Cambodia to independence from France in 1953.

Despite long periods of exile and his abdication in 2004 due to ill health, he remained an influential figure.

Sihanouk abdicated in 2004 in favour of his son, King Norodom Sihamoni.

"His death was a great loss to Cambodia," said his assistant and relative Prince Sisowath Thomico. "King Sihanouk did not belong to his family, he belonged to Cambodia and to history."

His body is expected to be returned to Cambodia for an official funeral at the royal palace in Phnom Penh, a Cambodian government spokesman said.

Political broker


Born in 1922, Sihanouk was the eldest son of King Norodom Suramarit and Queen Kossamak.

The BBC's Guy Delauney looks back at the life of the former Cambodian king
Educated at French schools in Saigon and in Paris, the Nazi-controlled Vichy government in France crowned Sihanouk king of Cambodia in 1941, bypassing his father in the hope that the 18-year-old could easily be manipulated.

However, after the war Sihanouk embarked on an international campaign aimed at ensuring independence for Cambodia.

It was achieved without bloodshed in 1953 - after nearly a century of French rule. Two years later Sihanouk abdicated in favour of his father and became both prime minister and foreign minister of his country.

He tried - but failed - to keep the country from the Cold War conflict that engulfed South East Asia in the 1970s.

When a US-backed coup installed Lon Nol as Cambodia's leader, Sihanouk - by then alienated by US bombing raids on Vietnamese communist guerrillas inside Cambodia - was forced into exile in Beijing.

It was from there that he struck an ill-fated deal with the emerging Maoist rebel force, the Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, Sihanouk returned as head of state but was subsequently detained.

He remained confined to the royal palace for most of the four years of the regime's rule, during which time an estimated 1.7 million people died.

People were killed or worked and starved to death, as the Khmer Rouge emptied cities and forced Cambodians to work on the land.

Sihanouk later condemned the Khmer Rouge for the deaths of the Cambodians, including of several of his own children.

When Vietnamese forces ousted the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk went again to Beijing. He was to remain outside the country for 13 years, as Cambodia faced civil war and the struggle to rebuild from economic devastation.


Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge brought death and starvation to millions of Cambodians
When the UN in 1991 persuaded the Vietnamese to withdraw and set Cambodia on the road to democracy, Sihanouk returned, and was again crowned king in 1993.

His role was increasingly one of broker between Cambodia's warring political factions. But as the country slowly worked its way towards political stability, Sihanouk's health steadily worsened.

In 2004, he announced he would step down in favour of one of his sons, the little-known Norodom Sihamoni. The former ballet dancer was crowned king in October 2004.

After that, Sihanouk spent much of his time overseas, in Beijing and Pyongyang.

But he remained a prominent national figure who - although criticised as autocratic and elitist, and blamed by some for his initial endorsement of the Khmer Rouge - symbolised constancy through Cambodia's years of violence.

source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19943963
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US: Manufacturing group questions Vietnam's TPP participation

The addition of Vietnam to the US government's list of countries using both child labour and forced labour in the production of garments has prompted a group of American manufacturers to question its participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks.

South Sudan, Suriname and Vietnam have all been added to the US Department of Labor's fourth annual list of countries where child labour and forced labour have been found in the production of garments. In total, 74 countries are on the list.

In response, the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC) has sent a letter to US Trade Representative Ron Kirk calling on the Obama Administration to reconsider whether Vietnam is a suitable partner for any TPP agreement.

The TPP pact is currently being negotiated by the US, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Malaysia and Peru, with Canada and Mexico poised to join the next round of negotiations in December.

Besides the labour report, AMTAC argues that a host of other factors demonstrate Vietnam has not yet made the reforms needed to be worthy of further consideration for TPP participation.

"Vietnam's intolerance of competing political parties, lack of press freedom, state-owned enterprise-dominated economy, lack of an independent judiciary, and pervasive human rights abuses are each and of themselves reasons why Vietnam's participation in the TPP should be questioned by the Obama Administration," it says.

Separately, a new report from the Congressional Research Service says Vietnam's involvement in the TPP free trade agreement has the potential to shift global trading patterns for textiles and demand for US textile exports.

source: by Leonie Barrie October 11,2012 http://www.just-style.com
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Vietnamese Disarray: Two Leaders and a Nation

The economic deterioration of Vietnam provides the perfect setting for regime change, with a scandal-ridden prime minister seeking to hold onto his position

The economic nightmare that has befallen Vietnam has resulted in much finger-pointing, with President Truong Tan Sang and his supporters putting Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in the crosshairs.

Over the past decade, Vietnam benefited greatly from economic reforms and a wealth of foreign investment. During the heyday, it was all too easy for the country’s leadership and the Communist Party to hide the waste and corruption behind skyrocketing economic growth.

Today, however, all of that is over. The waste, corruption, and poor management that have been the norm are now the target of government crackdowns, if only to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. A power struggle between the prime minister and president, state enterprises deep in the red over senseless business endeavors and the arrests of banking officials have all signaled to the Vietnamese people that these are uncertain times.

The path for two leaders
If Prime Minister Dung can survive a challenge to his leadership, one could expect the prime minister to consolidate and strengthen his position within the party by marginalizing President Sang and weeding out his supporters. Rather than taking this challenge as an impetus to change, the prime minister will likely use it as an excuse to double down and stay the path. Now more than ever, Vietnam cannot risk instability, which President Sang would be accused of bringing about. For better or worse, Prime Minister Dung’s vision will serve as the vision for Vietnam.

Should Sang succeed in ousting the prime minister, Dung’s allies would be purged from public office and replaced with the president’s people. Whether the prime minister’s allies would be arrested or simply exiled from public service is unknown; however, the arrest of the prime minister would prove to be a bold move on the president’s part in demonstrating to the people his intent to rid the government of corruption.

On the other hand, should there be a settlement between the two leaders, one could expect more power sharing and more input in government from President Sang and his supporters, all under the guise of increased accountability. Prime Minister Dung’s position within the government and party would be severely weakened, as the president would undoubtedly demand concessions, lest the prime minister face a political coup d’état. The Communist Party, in attempt to maintain control over the country, would sooner throw the prime minister under the bus than endure the black eye that would result from a public intraparty war.

An institutional problem
Regardless of the outcome, what is certain is that this so-called struggle for accountability will do little to aid the Vietnamese people, whose fortunes are unlikely to change. The power struggle is simply that--a power struggle, not one born out of a desperate need to reform Vietnam. This struggle is not one that will benefit the masses but the family and friends of those individuals in power. This is ultimately a struggle of the ruling class, not the proletariat; and when the dust finally settles, it will be business as usual.

It is not the individuals that need changing but the institution itself. Although the Communist Party today remains communist in name only, the organization is notorious for its lack of transparency, which has led Vietnam down this path of financial disaster. Corruption and poor management remain hidden from view until it is too late, at which point the wealthy few can hide while the working majority are left holding the bag labeled “debt.” A patronage system allows family and friends to reap the benefits of having people in high places, rather than having the best person for the job.

A change in leadership would do little to fix the problems that plague Vietnam today. Corruption and poor management is not the cause of Vietnam’s ailments; it is a symptom. The cause has been and remains the Communist Party itself and its ability to operate with impunity. A change in leadership must follow with a change in government and government policy.

A second look
For almost four decades, the Communist Party of Vietnam has provided stability, whether in poverty or prosperity. During the early days when ideology governed the country’s affairs, the people were poor and hungry. However, because they were poor and hungry, they were too distracted to challenge the party. When the country boomed, the people experienced an awakening of sorts--with a little bit of luck and a little bit of hard work, they could be rich, or at least better off than they were yesterday.

The party assumed credit for this success and impressed upon the people its work in helping the nation. The party was good for Vietnam. Whatever else the party had done or was involved in on the side, properly or improperly, the party had led the country out from poverty to prosperity. No one would complain as long as the country continued to prosper. But now, as the economy slows and foreign investment dwindles, the people are fed just enough, rich just enough, to look at their leaders with a critical eye.

Although the economic downturn and power struggle have provided an opening for the people to demand real change in government, the party remains too intertwined in Vietnamese society for it to simply roll over and die. In all likelihood, change will first come from within the party rather than from without, but whether said change will benefit the people remains questionable.

With more than 60 percent of the Vietnamese population born after the Vietnam War, these are people born into families whose greatest difficulties at time were putting food on the table. Now, these same people, many of whom have families of their own, face an entirely different set of challenges--climbing the social ladder, a climb that cannot be achieved in a struggling economy. They have seen the light at the end of the tunnel but are now seeing that light fade away due to the government’s mismanagement.

Much like weeds, cutting the head will achieve nothing; one must remove the roots. Maybe it is time for the Communist Party to step aside.

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa who researches on international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)
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